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TOWARD THE VIABILITY OF STATE-BASED 
LEGISLATION TO ADDRESS WORKPLACE 
CAPTIVE AUDIENCE MEETINGS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Paul M. Secunda† 
INTRODUCTION 
Private-sector employers in the United States routinely hold 
mandatory workplace meetings during union organization campaigns 
to express anti-union views to their employees.1  Employees must 
attend these meetings at pain of discharge and may not be able to 
leave these meetings, ask questions, or espouse pro-union views.2  
Indeed, these captive audience meetings are so effective that 
American employers are increasingly using this technique to also 
inform their employees about their political and religious views.3 
Because unions are generally not guaranteed access to employer 
property to share their pro-union message with employees,4 organized 
labor rightly believes such meetings give employers the ability to 
effectively intimidate and harass employees during union 
 
 †  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of Law.  I would like to 
thank Matt Finkin, Dennis Nolan, Cindy Estlund, Seth Harris, Craig Becker, Jeff Hirsch, and 
Brent Hunsberger, for their helpful comments and insights on the ideas contained in this essay.  
All errors or omissions, however, are mine alone.  I would also like to extend my appreciation to 
the Lamar Order of the University of Mississippi School of Law for providing funds to support 
the research and writing of this essay. 
 1. One recent study found that 92% of four hundred-studied union campaigns included 
workplace captive audience meetings. Kate Bronfenbrenner, Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of 
Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organizing, U.S. TRADE DEFICIT REVIEW 
COMMISSION 81 (2000), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=reports (last 
visited June 9, 2007). 
 2. See discussion infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Lewis Maltby, Office Politics: Civic Speech Shouldn’t Get Employees Fired, LEGAL 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005 (documenting increased use of political captive audience workplace 
meetings); see also discussion infra Part I.B. 
 4. See Lechmere Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). 
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organizational campaigns.5  And even beyond the issue of relative 
economic power in organizational campaigns, forcing employees to 
attend meetings during work to hear their employer’s views is simply 
wrong.6  It represents the worst type of misuse of employer economic 
power and interferes with employees’ dignitary interests.7  It is 
therefore not surprising at all that unions would very much like to see 
such captive audience meetings prohibited. 
So what is being done to address this inequitable state of affairs?  
Although federal labor law in the United States does not address the 
ability of employers to express their views to workers on political and 
religious issues,8 the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)9 as permitting employers to 
hold these captive audience meetings with their employees on labor-
oriented issues.10  Although this has been the state of affairs in the 
captive audience meeting context for some time,11 there has been a 
 
 5. See William T. Dickens, The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections: 
Law and Reality Once Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 570-71 (1983) (concluding that 
employers’ captive audience speeches have statistically significant effects on voting in union 
certification elections). 
 6. As Professor Balkin has observed, “[f]ew audiences are more captive than the average 
worker.”  J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First 
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 423 (1990). 
 7. Cf. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (“While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, 
he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.”).  See 
also Maltby, supra note 3 (“But when [employers] use their economic power over people’s 
livelihoods to control the political behavior of U.S. citizens, it threatens American democracy.”). 
 8. There are important First Amendment considerations concerning whether such 
limitations on political and religious speech qualify as reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions, see, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) 
(restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech must be narrowly tailored to a “significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”); whether 
employers should have less constitutional protections in the workplace captive audience context, 
see, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government . . . to shut off 
discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is . . . dependent upon showing that substantial 
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”); Rowan v. U.S. Post 
Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (“In today’s complex society we are inescapably 
captive audiences for many purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual autonomy must 
survive to permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail.”); and whether 
such laws are content-discriminatory, see, e.g., Waremart Foods v. N.L.R.B., 354 F.3d 870, 875 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding California union access law content-discriminatory); but all of these 
topics are beyond the scope of this essay.  The focus here will be on labor-oriented captive 
audience meetings and whether state law prohibiting such meetings is preempted by federal 
labor law. 
 9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 
 10. See Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L.REV. 
1527, 1536-37 (2002) (“The [NLRA] not only protects employers’ right to express their 
opposition to unionization; it also recognizes their right to compel employees to listen to them in 
‘captive audience’ meetings, while excluding union representatives from the workplace 
altogether.”); see also discussion infra Part I.A. 
 11. As discussed in more detail below, employer captive audience meetings were found 
lawful by the National Labor Relations Board in Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 
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recent push by organized labor in the United States to prohibit 
employers from holding captive audience meetings concerning labor-
related, political, or religious speech.12 
Under Worker Freedom Act (WFA) legislation percolating 
presently in a number of state legislatures,13 employers would not only 
be prohibited from holding mandatory sessions during work to 
express opinions on labor-related, political, and religious issues,14 but 
would be liable for retaliating against workers who reported the 
holding of such sessions.15  Although a couple of states are close to 
passing WFA legislation,16 only modified-legislation in New Jersey, 
not addressing labor-oriented captive audience meetings, has actually 
been enacted.17  And although New Jersey’s prohibition on captive 
audience meetings involving political and religious topics might pose 
constitutional problems,18 the focus on this essay is whether an 
unmodified version of Worker Freedom Act legislation would be 
preempted by federal labor law.19 
This essay answers this question in two ways.  First, under current 
labor preemption doctrine and Supreme Court precedent interpreting 
rights of states to continue to regulate property and contract rights in 
the labor relations context, courts should find that such state laws are 
not preempted by the NLRA.  Nevertheless, opponents will likely 
argue that such state captive audience meeting legislation should be 
 
(1948), and the Supreme Court approved this holding in N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers (NuTone & 
Avondale), 357 U.S. 357 (1958).  See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 12. AFL-CIO, Fighting for Workers’ Rights, 
http://aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/ 
workersrights.cfm (last visited June 4, 2007) (“The Worker Freedom Act will give employees the 
freedom to walk away from these indoctrination meetings—and would bar employers from firing 
or disciplining workers who choose not to attend or who report unlawful, forced meetings.”). 
 13. For a discussion of specific state legislation, see discussion infra Part II. 
 14. WFA legislation does not speak specifically about union-oriented speech, but instead 
defines “political matters” to include discussions on whether or not to join a labor organization.  
See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Connecticut Substitute House Bill No. 7326, § 1(b) (Jan. Session 2007), 
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007); 
Oregon House Bill 2893, http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/measures/hb2800.dir/hb2893.intro.html 
(last visited May 15, 2007). 
 16. As of June 2007, Connecticut and Oregon are closest to passing such legislation.  See 
infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. 
 17. New Jersey enacted the New Jersey Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act 
in 2006, N.J.S.A. §§ 34:19-9-34:19-14. 
 18. See supra note 8. 
 19. This is a crucial question given the vast scope of implied federal preemption under the 
NLRA.  See Estlund, supra note 10, at 1530-31 (“The broad implied federal preemption of state 
and local laws affecting collective labor relations blocks democratically inspired reforms or 
variations at the state and local level, as well as state common law innovation.”). 
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found preempted under the Machinists line of cases.20  Under this 
labor preemption doctrine, federal labor law preempts any state 
regulation of activity that, although not directly regulated by the 
NLRA, was intended by Congress “to be controlled by the free play 
of economic forces” in a “zone free from all regulations, whether state 
or federal.”21  Opponents of WFA legislation would argue that these 
laws interfere too greatly with the free play of economic forces left 
unregulated by the NLRA by placing the state’s thumb on the union’s 
side of the scale.  This would upset the delicate balance of economic 
weapons that the labor law currently permits during union organizing 
campaigns.22 
There are, however, a number of well-known exceptions to the 
Machinists doctrine in the area of state police powers and the 
regulation of property rights.  Under this line of cases, traditional 
areas of state concern are within the states’ power to regulate and, 
therefore, not within the scope of NLRA preemption.23  Either the 
state can provide for minimum conditions in the workplace under its 
police powers or place property restrictions on the bundle of property 
rights that the state grants to its property owners—that is, the bundle 
of property rights that private property owners possess would not 
include the use of their property for labor, political, or religious 
purposes.  Under this conception, and consistent with Section 8(c) of 
the NLRA,24 management can still inform employees of their views of 
unionization, but may not force employees into mandatory meetings 
to hear those views.  In this manner, a court deciding a preemption 
challenge to the Worker Freedom Act should find that the states have 
the inherent power to pass such laws under principles of federalism.25 
Nevertheless, given the current conservative political bent and 
judicial philosophy of the federal judiciary, there is reason to believe 
that Worker Freedom Act legislation may be found preempted 
 
 20. Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 
427 U.S. 132 (1976).  Machinist preemption and labor preemption doctrine generally is discussed 
in more detail infra Part III. 
 21. Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc). 
 22. See, e.g., Waremart Foods, 337 N.L.R.B. 289, 289 (2001) (“The Respondent asserts that 
the ability to exclude non-union representatives from its property is the kind of economic 
weapon that Congress intended to be available to employers and thus is not subject to regulation 
by the States.”), vacated on other grounds, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 23. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (finding that 
under NLRA employer has “legal rights to the possession and protection of its property”). 
 24. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).  Part I.A examines in detail the free speech protections of Section 
8(c) of the NLRA. 
 25. Indeed, “the strength and breadth of implied labor law preemption seems out of step 
with the powerful tide of recent federalism decisions.”  Estlund, supra note 10, at 1574 n.211. 
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because of a too-aggressive application of Machinist preemption 
and/or a general unfamiliarity with labor law.  Consequently, it is also 
necessary to answer the initial question of whether WFA legislation 
would be preempted by going back to first principles and asking 
whether current labor preemption doctrine should be modified. 
Following the pioneering work of Professor Michael Gottesman 
in this area,26 this essay renews the call for a reconceptualization of 
labor preemption doctrine by the Supreme Court.  Professor 
Gottesman has cogently argued that rights protected by federal labor 
laws come in two varieties—those where the entire field is occupied 
by federal law (“conduct on a continuum”) and those areas where the 
federal law just provides some restrictions (“conduct not on a 
continuum”).27  Like access to property cases, workplace captive 
audience meeting cases should fall into the latter category once the 
minimum conditions of free speech under Section 8(c) are satisfied.  
That is, once federal labor law is satisfied by permitting the free 
exchange of ideas on unionization between employers and their 
employees, the state should then be able to go beyond that floor and 
provide additional protections to employees to be free from 
mandatory indoctrination sessions by their employers.  And this 
conception should apply not only to labor-oriented speech, but to the 
growing use of political and religious captive audience speech by 
employers as well. 
Such a fundamental reconceptualization of labor preemption law, 
of course, will not happen overnight, and would require the Supreme 
Court to reconsider the foundations of its labor preemption 
jurisprudence.  Although the Court as currently constituted is unlikely 
to undertake this process, this essay seeks to plant the seeds for a 
future time when this type of American labor law reform has a more 
receptive audience on the Court. 
This essay is divided into four sections.  Section I examines the 
current state of federal labor law in the labor-oriented captive 
audience meeting context and finds there is virtually no constraint on 
an employer’s ability to use this highly-effective and harassing 
campaign tactic during union organizational campaigns.  Section II 
explores current state legislative responses sponsored by organized 
labor and notes the increasing success of these state legislative 
initiatives.  Section III applies traditional labor preemption doctrine 
 
 26. Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating 
Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355 (1990). 
 27. Id. at 357-59. 
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and concludes that courts should find such state-based responses to 
worker captive audience meetings not preempted by the NLRA.  
Recognizing that WFA legislation could still be found preempted, 
Section IV renews Professor Gottesman’s call for a modified approach 
to labor preemption doctrine in order to place WFA legislation on a 
more solid doctrinal foundation. 
I. FEDERAL LABOR LAW AND WORKPLACE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE 
MEETINGS 
The lack of state action in private-sector workplace captive 
audience meetings means that workers generally do not have federal 
constitutional rights to free speech in the workplace.28  Instead, much 
of the legal analysis concerning private-sector workplace captive 
audience meetings in the United States takes place under federal and 
state statutory law.  Even in the public sector, where First 
Amendment rights sometimes do exist, there has never been any right 
found to be free from captive audience speech by employers in the 
workplace.29  Consequently, workers have historically looked to the 
federal labor laws when seeking protection from forced attendance at 
anti-union employer speeches. 
A. The Use of Workplace Captive Audience Meetings in Union 
Campaigns 
Under these federal labor laws, however, workers in the United 
States remain remarkably unprotected from workplace captive 
audience speech by their employers.  Such captive audience speech 
occurs when employers require either supervisors to discuss anti-
union opinions with their subordinates or when employers require 
employees to listen to the employer’s anti-union message at 
 
 28. See Otis B. Grant, Law and Perceptions: Internal Investigations and Employee Privacy 
Interest in Public Sector Employment, 71 UMKC L.REV. 1, 5 (2002).  Somewhat related, some 
commentators have argued that sexually harassed employees should be considered captive 
audiences in the workplace and harassers should receive no First Amendment protection for 
their speech.  See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 6, at 424 (“[W]e might do well to shift the paradigmatic 
case of the captive audience from the passengers on the public bus or the child running through 
stations on the radio dial to the employee working for low wages in a tight job market who is 
sexually harassed by her employer or co-worker.”).  This theory, however, has not been adopted 
by many courts and the Supreme Court has never extended the constitutional captive audience 
speech doctrine into the workplace. 
 29. But see Hamilton County Welfare Dept., 3 Ohio Pub. Employee Rep. ¶ 3036, n.5 (May 
12, 1986) (“There are conceivable constitutional arguments against public sector captive 
audiences which do not apply to private sector employers. At least it is arguable that a public 
sector employer’s compelled audience meets the state action element requisite to a claim of 
violation of the 14th Amendment.”). 
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mandatory meetings during work time.  Although in a formal sense 
employees are free to walk away from such speech or not attend such 
meetings, in reality, employees risk being fired if they are considered 
to be insubordinate to their supervisors by failing to listen them or by 
not attending anti-union assemblies.30  Indeed, employees can be 
lawfully terminated for merely asking questions of their employers 
during such a meeting31 or for leaving such meetings without 
permission.32  One former member of the NLRB characterized this 
power of employers to monopolize its workplace for anti-union 
speeches as “one of the most potent and effective methods by which 
self-organization of employees [can] be stifled.”33 
It is therefore hardly surprising that the vast majority of 
employers faced with a union organizing campaign make anti-union 
presentations to their workers during mandatory meetings.  For 
instance, a federal government report studied four hundred union 
elections and found that 92% of these union campaigns involved 
employers forcing employees to attend captive audience meetings.34  
 
 30. The complete power that employers exercise over employees in the workplace and 
subsequent impact that captive audience speech has on employees is well captured in the THIRD 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 125 (1938): 
In considering the effect of the employer’s conduct upon the self-organization of 
employees, there must be borne in mind the control wielded by the employer over 
his employees—a control which results from the employees’ complete dependence 
upon their jobs, generally their only means of livelihood and economic existence. 
As the natural result of the employer’s economic power, employees are alertly 
responsive to the slightest suggestion of the employer. Activities, innocuous and 
without significance, as between two individuals economically independent of each 
other or of equal economic strength, assume enormous significance and heighten to 
proportions of coercion when engaged in by the employer in his relationships with 
his employees . . . . 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the practical realities of the workplace environment for 
workers: “Thus, an employer’s rights cannot outweigh the equal rights of the employees to 
associate freely . . . [a]nd any balancing of those rights must take into account the economic 
dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, 
because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more 
readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear.”  N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 
(1969). 
 31. N.L.R.B. v. Prescott Indus. Prod. Co., 500 F.2d 6, 11 (8th Cir. 1974); see also Hicks 
Ponder Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 806, 814 (1967) (upholding employer right to eject vocal pro-union 
workers who speak out once captive audience meetings has begun). 
 32. Litton Sys., Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968); see also F.W. Woolworth Co., 251 
N.L.R.B. 1111, 1113 (1980) (permitting employer to exclude pro-union employees from captive 
audience meetings). 
 33. Livingston Shirt Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 411 (1953) (Member Murdoch, dissenting).  
More recently, another Board Member, former Chairman Gould, has stated: “[T]he captive 
audience technique.  .  . has proved to be an extremely devastating technique in organizational 
campaigns.”  William B. Gould IV, Independent Adjudication, Political Process, and the State of 
Labor-Management Relations: The Role of the National Labor Relations Board, 82 IND. L.J. 461, 
484 (2007). 
 34. Bronfenbrenner, supra note 1, at 81. 
SECUNDAARTICLE29-2.DOC 1/24/2008  2:00:03 PM 
216 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 29:209 
The average union campaign had eleven captive audience meetings.35  
Additionally, 78% of the employers studied instructed supervisors to 
give anti-union messages to their subordinates.36 
B. The Legal Status of Workplace Captive Audience Meetings Under 
Federal Law 
Although American labor law has remained largely fixed in the 
captive audience area for some fifty years now, there was a previous 
period of time when workers could seek varying degrees of protection 
from such workplace speech under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA or Act).37  When enacted in 1935 as the Wagner Act,38 the 
NLRA had no provisions specifically addressing the intersection 
between employee organizational rights and employer speech rights.39  
Section 7 of the Wagner Act provided that workers had the right to 
organize, to collectively bargain, and to engage in concerted activity 
for mutual aid and protection.40  Employers were liable under Section 
8(1) of the Act if they interfered, coerced, or restrained employees in 
the exercise of any of these Section 7 rights.41 
Given this language, the general thought was that employers 
were supposed to remain neutral during union organizational 
campaigns.42  When employers instead forced workers to attend 
mandatory sessions to hear the employer’s anti-union views, the 
National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board) initial reaction 
was to say that this was employer activity that interfered with 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. 
 38. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
 39. Nevertheless, as early as 1939, the Supreme Court had made clear that employers 
retained significant property rights even in the face of protected Section 7 activity by employees.  
See N.L.R.B. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 253 (1939) (finding that under 
NLRA employer has “legal rights to the possession and protection of its property.”). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (“Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual 
aid or protection.”). 
 41. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). Although under the Wagner Act the interference provisions were 
initially codified as Section 8(1) and the discrimination provisions as Section 8(3), the Taft-
Hartley Amendments in 1947 recodified these employer unfair labor practice sections as 
Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3), and added union unfair labor practices under Section 8(b). 
 42. See Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First 
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 366 (1995) (“[T]he N.L.R.B. took the position 
in its early years—in fact, in its very first case—that the employer should remain neutral during 
union organizing drives because of its economic power and control over the workplace.”).  For a 
view that employers should still have no role in representational campaigns, see generally Craig 
Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation Elections and Federal Labor Law, 
77 MINN. L.REV. 495, 500 (1993). 
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employees’ rights to organize under Section 7.  More formally, the 
Board established a per se rule against all workplace captive audience 
meetings in Clark Brothers Co., Inc.43  In support of this rule, the 
Board observed that: 
[It] has long recognized that “the rights guaranteed to employees 
by the Act include the full freedom to receive aid, advice, and 
information from others, concerning those rights and their 
enjoyment.” Such freedom is meaningless, however, unless the 
employees are also free to determine whether or not to receive 
such aid, advice, and information. To force employees to receive 
such aid, advice, and information impairs that freedom; it is 
calculated to, and does, interfere with the selection of a 
representative of the employees’ choice. And this is so, wholly 
apart from the fact that the speech itself may be privileged under 
the Constitution.44 
With regard to the potential constitutional issues caused by the rule’s 
restraint on employer speech in the workplace, the Board commented:  
“[The captive audience] was not an inseparable part of the speech, any 
more than might be the act of a speaker in holding physically the 
person whom he addresses in order to assure his attention.  The law 
may and does prevent such a use of force without denying the right to 
speak.”45  In other words, the Board felt it was only regulating 
employer conduct, not employer speech.  The Board also pointed out 
that the employer had other alternative means for conveying its 
message about the union to its employees, short of threatening to 
terminate their employment if they did not attend the mandated 
meeting.46 
Any future debate over the merits of the Clark Brothers doctrine, 
however, was superseded by the passage a year later of the Taft-
Hartley Amendments of 1947.47  Taft-Hartley completely changed the 
dynamics of the workplace captive audience debate in American labor 
law.48  Significantly, Congress felt that the Wagner Act was tilted too 
far in favor of union interests in that it only addressed employees’ 
right to organize and join a union, only set forth employer unfair labor 
practices, and did not protect employers’ speech rights in opposition 
 
 43. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946). 
 44. Id. at 805 (emphasis in original and internal citations omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 167, 172-187.  The Taft-Hartley Amendments were enacted over 
the veto of President Truman. 
 48. Becker, supra note 42, at 558 (“Since the Taft-Hartley Act, . . . the Board has refused to 
separate the compulsion to listen from the freedom to speak.”). 
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to a union campaign.49  Not only did Taft-Hartley amend the NLRA 
to emphasize that employees may refrain from any Section 7 activities 
and to insert union unfair labor practices,50 but just as importantly it 
added significant employer speech protections under a new provision, 
Section 8(c). 
Section 8(c) of the Act states: 
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the 
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or 
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor 
practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression 
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.51 
As a result of this new provision, employers were now permitted 
broad free speech and expression rights in the workplace, as long they 
did not coerce their employees through threats or promises.52  Not 
surprisingly, given this robust language, the Board quickly abandoned 
the per se rule against captive audience speech as inconsistent with the 
new rights granted to employers under Section 8(c).53 
The Truman Board, however, still sought to regulate the use of 
captive audience speech in the workplace.  Although the Board did 
not seek to limit the employer’s non-coercive speech during captive 
audience meetings, it did seek to level the playing field by permitting 
unions on the employer’s premise to give presentations on the 
advantages of unionization.  Under the Bonwit-Teller doctrine,54 the 
Board began in 1951 to require that employers who gave captive 
audience speeches to provide “equal opportunity” for unions to 
 
 49. See Paul Alan Levy, The Unidimensional Perspective of the Reagan Labor Board, 16 
RUTGERS L. J. 269, 274 (1985) (“[T]he claim of one-sidedness on the part of the Board 
prompted Congress in 1947 to enact a law designed to equalize the relationship between 
corporations and union, the Taft-Hartley Act.”). 
 50. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b). 
 51. Id. § 158(c).  The Supreme Court has subsequently commented that section 8(c) 
“merely implements the First Amendment.” N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 
(1969). 
 52. Whether employer speech is considered coercive is a somewhat involved issue and is 
discussed in more detail in Gissel, 395 U.S. 575 (threats) and N.L.R.B. v. Exchange Parts, Inc., 
375 U.S. 405 (1964) (promises).  Because this article assumes that the captive audience speech by 
employers does not contain unlawful threats or promises, this line of cases is not discussed 
further. 
 53. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 (1948) (“[T]he language of Section 8 (c) of the 
amended Act, and its legislative history, make it clear that the doctrine of the Clark Bros. case 
no longer exists as a basis for finding unfair labor practices in circumstances such as this record 
discloses.”).  Indeed, “the legislative history of Section 8(c) contains adverse comment upon the 
Board’s decision in Clark Bros., that a captive audience is per se unlawful.”  Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 
96 N.L.R.B. 608, 614 n.12 (1951).  Because the literal language of Section 8(c) applies only to 
unfair labor practice cases and not election cases, instances of employer captive audiences 
meetings could still have been found to warrant a new election, but the Board never adopted this 
view of Section 8(c). 
 54. Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951), modified, 104 N.L.R.B. 497 (1953). 
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present their side of the story to workers at the employer’s facility.55  
The Board reasoned that an employer captive audience speech 
coupled with a valid no-solicitation rule was tantamount to a 
discriminatory application of the no-solicitation rule and an unfair 
labor practice under Sections 8(a)(1).56  Even apart from this 
reasoning, the Board felt that unequal union access to employees in 
the workplace interfered with the employees’ “right to hear both sides 
of the story under circumstances which reasonably approximate 
equality.”57  Finally, the doctrine was seen as compatible with the free 
speech provisions of Section 8(c) because the rule did not limit what 
the employer could say, but only required certain employer conduct in 
permitting similar access to unions to the employer’s facility to make 
its own pro-union speeches. 
Nevertheless, when the composition of the Board became 
majority Republican two years later,58 the new Eisenhower Board in 
Livingston Shirt Corp.59 abandoned the Bonwit-Teller equal 
opportunity doctrine.  There, the Board concluded: 
[I]n the absence of either an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule 
(prohibiting union access to company premises on other than 
working time) or a privileged no-solicitation rule (broad, but 
unlawful because of the character of the business), an employer 
does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelection 
 
 55. Id. at 612 (“[A]n employer who chooses to use his premises to assemble his employees 
and speak against a union may not deny that union’s reasonable request for the same 
opportunity to present its case, where the circumstances are such that only by granting such 
request will the employees have a reasonable opportunity to hear both sides.”). 
 56. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Republic Aviation Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 324 U.S. 
793 (1945), employers could prohibit union solicitation and distribution by employees during 
working time, but not during non-working times in non-working areas of the facility without 
violating Section 8(a)(1).  Id. at 803.  The Bonwit-Teller Board felt it a discriminatory application 
of the no-solicitation rule to permit employers to give speeches to it employees in violation of its 
lawful no-solicitation rule, but not to give the same right to the union.  Bonwit-Teller, Inc., 96 
N.L.R.B. at 611. 
 57. 96 N.L.R.B. at 612. 
 58. Interestingly, this narrative of the history of the captive audience speech doctrine under 
federal labor law suggests that the political affiliation of the Board Members played a large role 
in how Board law developed in this area.  Elsewhere, through empirical studies of other Board 
standards, I have argued that the Board may be less political than most commentators believe.  
See Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not As Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional 
Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51, 53-54 (2004).  
Nevertheless, it does appear that in particular divisive areas of labor law, such as the captive 
speech area, political affiliation of Board Members still plays a predictive role in how the Board 
decides cases.  See Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board, 8 
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 711 (2006) (“The only claim made in this Article is that ideology 
has been a persistent and, in many instances, a vote-predictive factor when the Board decides 
certain legal issues.”). 
 59. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953). 
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speech on company time and premises to his employees and denies 
the union’s request for an opportunity to reply.60 
In coming to this new conclusion, the Board refused to condition the 
free speech guarantees of Section 8(c) on giving a union a right to 
reply on the company’s premises.61  The Board also appeared to place 
additional emphasis on the employer’s property interests to exclude 
unwanted visitors from its facilities,62 finding that unions had equal 
opportunity to engage in comparable captive audience speech at their 
own union halls,63 and that, “one party [need not] be so strangely 
openhearted as to underwrite the campaign of the other.”64  All of this 
was the start of a trend of denying union access to employer property, 
as by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1956 opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Babcock 
& Wilcox,65 union organizers were not only being denied the 
opportunity to respond to employer captive audience speech in the 
workplace, but more generally from coming on to the employer’s 
property to distribute union literature and solicit membership.66 
 
 60. Id. at 409. 
 61. Id. at 406 (“If the privilege of free speech is to be given real meaning, it cannot be 
qualified by grafting upon it conditions which are tantamount to negation.”). 
 62. Id. (“We do not believe that unions will be unduly hindered in their right to carry on 
organizational activities by our refusal to open up to them the employer’s premises for group 
meetings, particularly since this is an area from which they have traditionally been excluded, and 
there remains open to them all the customary means for communicating with employees.”); see 
also id. (“The majority in Bonwit Teller did not cite, nor have we been able to find, any support 
in the statutory language or legislative history for holding that the employer who exercises his 
own admitted rights under the statute thereby incurs an affirmative obligation to donate his 
premises and working time to the union for the purpose of propagandizing the employees.”). 
 63. But see id. at 418 (Member Murdock, dissenting) (“[T]he natural prominence of the 
plant premises as an extremely effective forum for dissemination of employer antiunion views 
had, long before the advent of Bonwit Teller, been recognized as a fact of industrial life. To be 
short, this is true not because of any decision of this Board but simply because that is where the 
employees work.”); id. at 423 (“In contrast to the means open to the organizing employees, the 
employer speech on company time and property has the tremendous advantage of securing the 
undivided attention of all employees—interested, passive, and antagonistic. A carefully planned, 
extensive, and well-organized speech, under these circumstances, is hardly on a par with the 
limited time, argument, and opportunity open to the union.”). 
 64. Id. (“[A]n employer’s premises are the natural forum for him just as the union hall is 
the inviolable forum for the union to assemble and address employees.”).  But see id. at 410-11 
(Member Murdock, dissenting) (“I cannot believe that the majority’s action in holding that an 
employer may lawfully monopolize the most effective forum for persuading employees is 
consistent with the declared congressional policy which is not that of neutrality but of 
‘encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining.’”). 
 65. 351 U.S. 105 (1956). 
 66. Id. at 113.  The Court did allow nonemployee access to employer property to distribute 
union literature and solicit employee where the union was unable to reach workers through 
other available channels of communication, id. at 112, but this exception has been largely limited 
to such unusual settings as remote lumber camps.  See Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 70 N.L.R.B. 
178 (1946), enforced, 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).  And although the Board’s union access rules 
have been liberalized at times over the years, see, e.g.., Jean Country, 291 N.L.R.B. 11 (1988), 
Babcock & Wilcox’s more stringent limitation on nonemployee union solicitation and 
distribution on employer property was most recently expanded upon by the Supreme Court in 
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The Supreme Court signaled its approval of the Livingston Shirt 
decision in N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers (NuTone & Avondale).67  In 
NuTone & Avondale, the Court agreed that the employer, in most 
cases, had no obligation to provide access to its property to the union 
for speeches to employees.68  There, the Court stated that, “the Taft-
Hartley Act does not command that labor organizations as a matter of 
abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of every 
possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers, nor that 
they are entitled to use a medium of communication simply because 
the employer is using it.”69 
Nonetheless, and somewhat consistent with Babcock & Wilcox,70 
the Court did hold open the prospect that unions may gain access to 
an employer’s premises to convey a pro-union message if there is a 
showing by the union that they are “truly diminished” in their ability 
to communicate with employees.  The Court did not provide a hard 
and fast rule for when such circumstances might exist, but instead left 
such determinations to the industrial expertise of the Board in 
individual cases.71  Not surprisingly, however, there have been few 
cases over the years that have qualified for this limited exception.72  
As a result, while employers may exempt themselves from their own 
no-solicitation rules73 and regularly use captive audience speeches as 
part of their anti-union campaign arsenal, unions and their supporters 
remain largely without the opportunity to respond to such speeches 
under similar circumstances and conditions. 
Exceptions to this broad rule permitting employer captive 
audience speech without the ability for union response comes today in 
only three narrow situations:  (1) where the employer or union wants 
 
Lechmere, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., which eliminated the necessity to balance employers’ property 
interests against unions’/employees’ organizational rights.  502 U.S. 527, 535 (1992). 
 67. 357 U.S. 357 (1958). 
 68. Id. at 363 (“Certainly the employer is not obliged voluntarily and without any request to 
offer the use of his facilities and the time of his employees for pro-union solicitation.”).  The 
Court further observed that by allowing such union solicitation on its premises it may be accused 
on dominating or assisting a labor organization in violation of Section 8(a)(2).  Id. (citing 29 
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)). 
 69. Id. at 364. 
 70. Unlike Babcock & Wilcox, the Court in NuTone & Avondale does not appear to draw a 
distinction between nonemployee and employee speech, a distinction which is fundamental in 
the union solicitation and distribution context.  See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING 
LABOR LAW 84 (2d ed. 2005). 
 71. Id. at 363-64. 
 72. See, e.g., S&H Grossinger’s, 156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965), enforced in part, 372 F.2d 26 (2d 
Cir. 1967) (finding NuTone and Avondale equal opportunity exception applied where many 
employees were isolated in resort community). 
 73. See James Hotel Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963) (holding that employer may disregard 
own non-solicitation rule). 
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to hold a captive audience speech within twenty-four hours of a union 
election,74 (2) where the employer has combined coercive workplace 
captive audience speech with an unlawful no-solicitation rule,75 and 
(3) where “access” remedies for the union are appropriate in 
extraordinary cases involving particularly egregious unfair labor 
practices76 and “access is needed to offset harmful effects that have 
been produced by that conduct.”77  Subsequent attempts to argue for 
union access to employer’s premises to counter anti-union captive 
audience speeches beyond these limited circumstances have fallen on 
deaf ears at the Board over the years.78 
Short of fuller-access rights to counteract captive audience 
speech, the Board has thrown unions a bone in the form of so-called 
Excelsior Underwear lists.79  These employer-provided lists furnish 
 
 74. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953); see also Bro-Tech Corp., 330 N.L.R.B. 
37 (1999) (applying Peerless Plywood rule to use of sound trucks).  The purpose of this rule was 
to preserve the “laboratory conditions” of the election so that employees could exercise their 
free choice in deciding whether to be presented by a union.  See General Shoe Corp., 77 
N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948) (“An election can serve its true purpose only if the surrounding 
circumstances enable employees to register [a free and untrammeled] choice for or against a 
bargaining representative.”). 
 75. Montgomery Ward & Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846 (1964), enforced as modified, 339 F.2d 889 
(6th Cir. 1965) (finding Section 8(a)(1) violation where employer combined a coercive captive 
audience speech during work time with an unlawful non-solicitation rule that did not permit 
union solicitation during employee non-working hours in non-working areas).  But see May 
Department Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962), enforcement denied, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 
1963) (refusing to enforce unfair labor practice finding where an employer gave a captive 
audience speech and maintained a lawful no-solicitation policy because Board did not consider 
other alternative methods the union had for communicating with employees). 
 76. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 379 F.2d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 1967) 
(permitting as a remedy union being able to address employees on company premises in 
response to employer captive audience speech).  But see N.L.R.B. v. S & H Grossinger’s, 372 
F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1967) (denying union equal time on company premises to address 
employees during working time).  Overall, a remedy which requires the company to pay 
employees to listen to a union speech is considered “strong medicine” for flagrant employer 
violations and is consequently rare.  See N.L.R.B. v. Flomatic Corp., 347 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 
1965). 
 77. United Steelworkers of America v. N.L.R.B., 646 F.2d 616, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1981).  In 
such cases, “[i]f union access is needed to dissipate those effects, access may be granted even 
though the union has alternative means of communicating with employees.” Id. 
 78. See Litton Systems, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1030 (1968) (finding employees have no 
rights under NLRA to leave meetings which they are required by management to attend on 
company time and property); General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966) (refusing to return 
to Bonwit-Teller doctrine and set aside a union election where employer made anti-union 
speeches to employees at non-mandatory meetings and union was denied access to facility to 
address employees).  In General Electric, the Board indicated that it wished to see if the use of 
Excelsior Underwear list, see infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text, would alleviate some of 
the union’s organizational concerns.  Forty years later, the Board has not revisited whether it 
makes sense to return to the Bonwit-Teller rule in light of the continuing hurdles unions face in 
being able to organize employees even with the use of Excelsior Underwear lists.  Former Board 
Chairman Gould recently pointed out that the rationale of Livingston Shirt was left untouched 
by the Clinton Board.  Gould, supra note 33, at 484 n.111 (citing Beverly Enterprises-Hawaii, 
Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 335, 361 (1998) (Gould, Chairman, dissenting)). 
 79. 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
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unions that have filed a petition for a representation election the 
names and addresses of all employees who are eligible to vote in that 
election.80  Of course, it is hardly surprising that union organizers do 
not find this method of counteracting captive audience speech nearly 
as effective as being able to address employees directly on the 
employer’s premises.81 
More recently, however, unions have employed other techniques 
to gain access to employees at targeted employers.  For instance, 
unions have been using email, blogs, and the internet to communicate 
with workers.  The efficacy of these methods of communicating with 
workers is yet to be determined and there are still issues over whether 
the employer must permit the union the use of its electronic 
communications.82  Unions have also sought additional 
communication between their organizers and employees by having 
their organizers apply for jobs with the company they are seeking to 
organize.  Such “salting” practices have been upheld by the Supreme 
Court, but again do not seem to effectively counteract the power of 
the employer captive audience meeting.83 
Indeed, empirical studies indicate that even alternative methods 
for unions to communicate with workers are not nearly effective as 
employer captive audience meeting.84  In short, unions are playing a 
 
 80. Id. at 1239-40 (“[W]ithin 7 days after the Regional Director has approved a consent-
election agreement . . . or after the Regional Director or the Board has directed an election . . . , 
the employer must file with the Regional Director an election eligibility list, containing the 
names and addresses of all the eligible voters. The Regional Director, in turn, shall make this 
information available to all parties in the case.”).  The Excelsior Underwear list is seen as helping 
employees vindicate their organizational rights without raising the same property right issues in 
cases like NuTone & Avondale and Lechmere. 
 81. One need only consider a scenario in which the employer is located in a heavily-
populated urban center and employees live spread out across the metropolitan area.  The 
resources it takes to travel to each employee home or to otherwise contact them is a substantial 
hurdle to being effectively able to apprise them of arguments in favor of unionism.  
Nevertheless, the Board has refused to adopt a “big city” access rule.  See Monogram Models, 
Inc., 192 N.L.R.B. 705 (1971). 
 82. On March 27, 2007, the Board took the unusual step of hearing oral argument on this 
issue in the case of The Guard Publishing Company, d/b/a The Register-Guard.  See Jeffrey M. 
Hirsch, Register-Guard Oral Argument, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG, Mar. 27, 2007, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog 
/2007/03/registarguard_o.html (last visited June 11, 2007).  See also generally Jeffrey M. Hirsch, 
The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 GEORGE WASHINGTON L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2008); Martin H. Malin & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act 
in Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 83. N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec. Co., 516 U.S. 85 (1995).  The effectiveness of the 
salting strategy has been recently compromised by the Second Bush Board’s holding that the 
burden of proof falls on the salt to show the damage caused by an employer’s discriminatory 
failure to hire or discharge.  See Oil Capitol Sheet Metal, Inc., 349 N.L.R.B. No. 118 (2007). 
 84. See generally JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAW 
AND REALITY 90-92 (1976) (based on organizing campaigns study, finding that only about one-
third of employees attended union-sponsored meetings held away from the employer’s 
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constant game of catch-up.  With this current state of affairs, the labor 
movement has considered state statutory alternatives for protecting 
employees from the impact of captive audience speech in the 
workplace.85 
C. Political and Religious Expansion of American Workplace 
Captive Audience Speech 
In addition to the classic use of captive audience speech by 
employers to defeat union campaigns, there is increasing evidence 
that employers are also engaging in political and religious captive 
audience speech in the workplace.  During these sessions, employees 
are forced, at the pain of losing their jobs, to listen to their employer’s 
perspective on the latest political and religious issues of the day. 
For instance, during the last presidential election, the National 
Association of Manufacturers sought to have employers use their 
workplaces to have meetings with their employees to discuss partisan 
political issues.86  Employees were urged to act in their employer’s 
best interest by not voting for unacceptable candidates.87  These 
meetings were not voluntary and employees could lose their jobs by 
not attending.  As one commentator has observed, such political 
captive audience speeches are highly effective because “[p]eople need 
their jobs, and many will sacrifice their rights as citizens to continue to 
provide for themselves and their families.  Consequently, an employer 
that tries to use its financial muscle to control employees’ political 
behavior will often succeed.”88 
 
workplace).  But see discussion supra note 82-83 and accompanying text on newly-emerging 
techniques for unions to communicate with workers. 
 85. Presently pending federal legislation may also reinvigorate union organizational rights.  
On March 1, 2007, the House approved the Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA), H.R. 800, 110th 
Cong. (2007).  See Michael Newman & Shane Crase, The Future of Secret Ballot Elections Under 
the National Labor Relations Act, 54 FED. LAW. 14, 14 (2007). The EFCA would, among other 
things, require unions to be recognized based on signed authorization cards.  Id. By not having to 
go through the formal union election process, the EFCA might go a long way in undermining the 
importance of employer captive audience meetings.  Similarly, neutrality agreements, under 
which employer agree to remain neutral in a union organization campaign, would effectively 
eliminate or modify the use of anti-union captive audience speech.  See Cynthia Estlund, 
Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace By Contract Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L. 
& POL’Y J. 351, 357 (2007) (“A neutrality agreement aims to achieve by contract many of the 
reforms that unions have failed to secure by statute, such as organizer access to the workplace 
and restrictions on anti-union campaigns and ‘captive audience’ meetings.”).  Given the current 
political environment, it is unlikely, however, that the EFCA will be enacted any time soon.  
Accord id. at 352-53. 
 86. Center for Policy Alternatives, Worker Freedom from Mandatory Meetings, available at 
http://www.stateaction.org/issues/issue.cfm/issue/WorkerFreedom.xml (last visited June 9, 2007). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Maltby, supra note 3. 
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In addition to political speeches, there is increasing evidence that 
employers are also engaging in more religious proselytizing at work 
during captive audience meetings.89  Evangelical Christian 
organizations are offering Christian ministry services for employers to 
provide to their employees during work hours.90  Prayer breakfasts, 
faith-based training and education, and requests for information about 
employees’ religious affiliations are becoming part of the American 
workplace.91  One indication of the increasing prevalence of religion in 
the American workplace is the growth of Marketplace Ministries, Inc., 
which now has 1700 chaplains who make on-site visits to 300 
companies in 38 states.92  Although there are limits on the ability of 
employers to proselytize in the workplace under Title VII and parallel 
state anti-discrimination law,93 the relative lack of cases in this area 
suggest that employees do not yet feel comfortable fighting back 
against these workplace practices. 
 
 89. Center for Policy Alternatives, supra note 86. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Stephen Singer, Conn. Considers Bill to Prevent Proselytism in the Workplace, AP, Mar. 
11, 2006, available at 
http://www.christianpost.com/article/20060311/19361_Conn._Considers_Bill_to_Prevent 
_Proselytism_in_the_Workplace.htm (last visited June 9, 2007).  But the founder of the 
Marketplace Ministries group insists: “We’re not there to proselytize . . . I don’t take my faith to 
harass you or hurt you or make you feel inferior.”  Id.; see also Neela Banerjee, At Bosses’ 
Invitation, Chaplains Comes Into Workplace and Onto Payroll, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2006, at A16, 
available at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/ 
abstract.html?res=F30813FA345A0C778CDDAB0994DE404482 (last visited June 9, 2007) 
(“From car parts makers to fast food chains to financial service companies, corporations across 
the country are bringing chaplains into the workplace. At most companies, the chaplaincy 
resembles the military model, which calls for chaplains to serve the religiously diverse 
community before them, not to evangelize.”). 
 93. Title VII prohibits religious discrimination in the workplace, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 
and also requires employers to accommodate the religious practices of employees to the extent 
that it does not cause an undue burden to the employer.  Id. at § 2000e(j); Trans World Airlines, 
Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).  There is a good argument that employer-sponsored 
religious proselytizing could rise to the level of unlawful religious harassment if it otherwise 
satisfied the elements for a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.  See Michael D. 
Moberly, Bad News for Those Proclaiming the Good News: The Employer’s Ambiguous Duty to 
Accommodate Religious Proselytizing, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 61 (2001) (applying NLRA-
based approach to regulate workplace proselytizing); Josh Schopf, Religious Activity and 
Proselytization in the Workplace: The Murky Line Between Healthy Expression and Unlawful 
Harassment, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 39, 55 (1997) (“If an employer or co-worker 
attempts to impose his religious beliefs on others and does so in a constant and pervasive 
manner sufficient to create hostility, those targeted should not be forced to endure the 
imposition without being able to take legal measures to end such activity.”).  But see Meltebeke 
v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 903 P.2d 351, 363 (Or. 1995) (under Oregon anti-discrimination 
law, holding that employer must know that that religious proselytizing created an intimidating, 
hostile or offensive working environment).  Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) is of the long-held view that workplace proselytization can amount to 
unlawful harassment in appropriate circumstances.  See EEOC Dec. No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 842, 842 (Feb. 18, 1972). 
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Consequently, organized labor has sought not only to protect 
employees against labor-oriented captive audience meetings at work, 
but also against political and religious intimidation and pressure.  The 
states are starting to respond to this need by considering Workplace 
Freedom Act legislation. 
II. THE RISING TIDE OF STATE WORKPLACE CAPTIVE AUDIENCE 
LEGISLATION 
Although employer captive audience speech remains largely 
unregulated under the NLRA as discussed in the previous section, 
there has been significant legislative movement on the state level in 
the past few years to pass laws that would prohibit captive audience 
meetings involving political, religious, or labor-oriented speeches.94  
The same debates at the Board about employer ability to give such 
workplace speeches from fifty years ago continue today between 
business and labor lobbyists in this new battleground.  Employers 
believe that such laws would amount to a constitutional infringement 
on their free speech rights to communicate with their workers and 
would be inconsistent with existing federal labor law.  Unions respond 
that such legislation does not bar employers from holding such 
meetings, only from mandating employee attendance, and employees 
should not be forced to listen to speech they do not want to hear.95 
Following the lead of the AFL-CIO,96 a number of states have 
considered Worker Freedom Act (WFA) legislation.97  This legislation 
 
 94. One of the sponsors of one such captive audience bill introduced in Washington 
explained the impetus behind outlawing captive audience meetings in the workplace this way: 
“[Mandatory employment meetings are] one of the reasons we’ve seen such a decline in private-
sector unionism.  What we’re trying to do is restore some balance.”  See Ralph Thomas, Labor 
Lobbyists Push Union Bill; Quick Passage Sought - It Would Ban Companies from Requiring 
Attendance at Organization Meetings, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at B2. 
 95. For examples of the views of proponents and opponents of such state legislation, see the 
Nature and Sources of Support and Opposition in the Connecticut Judiciary Committee’s Joint 
Favorable Report on HB-7326 (Apr. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/JFR/H/2007HB-07326-R00JUD-JFR.htm (last visited June 4, 2007). 
 96. Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act Goes Into Effect Immediately, 
JACKSON LEWIS LEGAL UPDATE, Aug. 16, 2006, 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=979 (last visited May 15, 2007) 
(stating that the newly enacted New Jersey Workplace Freedom law stems from the AFL-CIO’s 
model Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act). 
 97. There are also so-called “State Financial Accountability Acts” which prohibit public or 
private employers from using state funds “to assist, deter, or promote” union organizing.  See, 
e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 16645-16649 (forbidding California employers who receive state grants 
or funds in excess of $10,000 from using such funding to “assist, promote, or deter union 
organizing”).  Such laws have been recently found not to be preempted by the NLRA by the en 
banc Ninth Circuit in Chamber of Commerce v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc), 
petition for cert. filed, 75 U.S.L.W. 3369 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2007) (No. 06-939), and the Second Circuit 
in Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2006).  Although such laws 
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would “give employees the freedom to walk away from political or 
religious indoctrination meetings—and would bar employers from 
firing or disciplining workers who choose not to attend or who report 
unlawful forced meetings.”98  Generally, it is clear in most of these 
bills that speech on “political matters” includes speech on labor 
organizing.99  None of these laws have yet to be enacted.  States with 
current Worker Freedom Act legislation with the best chance of being 
enacted include Connecticut and Oregon.100 
For instance, in Connecticut, the proposed captive audience bill, 
the Freedom in the Workplace Act, would prohibit an employer from 
requiring employees to attend an employer-sponsored meeting when 
the primary purpose is to communicate the employer’s opinion about 
religious or political matters.101  “Political matters” are further defined 
to include the decision to join or not join a labor organization,102 
though the legislation does not seek to impair rights under a collective 
 
could also help in preventing employee captive audience meetings, their focus is both broader 
and narrower than captive audience bills; broader in applying to many more labor activities, but 
narrower in only applying to employers that receive state funds.  They also concern legislation 
that potentially prevents speech as opposed to just prohibiting attendance at mandatory 
workplace meetings.  Because these cases raise substantially different issues under preemption 
analysis, these cases are not further focuses on in this essay. 
 98. AFL-CIO, 2007 State Working Families Agenda, 
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues 
/upload/WFAgenda2007.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007).  The AFL-CIO states that, “[a]t least 9 
states are expected to consider legislation to protect workers’ freedom in 2007.”  AFL-CIO, 
Fighting for Worker’s Rights, 
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/stateissues/workersrights.cfm (last visited May 15, 
2007). 
 99. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 100. As of early June 2007, the Oregon Worker Freedom Act has passed the Oregon House 
and is awaiting action by the Senate.  Oregon House Bill 2893, http://www.leg.state.or.us/07reg/ 
measures/hb2800.dir/hb2893.intro.html (last visited May 15, 2007); see also Brent Hunsberger, 
Unions Seek New Ally: The Law, THE OREGONIAN, May 11, 2007, 
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/oregonian/ 
index.ssf?/base/business/11788900037310.xml&coll=7 (last visited May 15, 2007).  Similarly, 
Connecticut Worker Freedom legislation is awaiting further action. Connecticut Substitute 
House Bill No. 7326 (Jan. Session 2007), available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-
07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007).  Similar bills have recently failed in Colorado and 
Washington.  See  Colorado General Assembly, Summarized History for Bill Number HB06-
1314, http://www.leg.state.co.us/CLICS2006A/ 
csl.nsf/fsbillcont3/9A96E6C3FF2C2B13872570E00064ABEB?Open&file=1314_enr.pdf (last 
visited May 10, 2007); WSLC Legislative Update—March 16, 2007, Dead or Alive . . . Still 
Wanted, http://www.wslc. 
org/legis/07lu0316.htm (last visited May 10, 2007). 
 101. Connecticut Substitute House Bill No. 7326, § 1(b) (Jan. Session 2007), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007).  Exceptions are 
made for religious or political matters which the employer by law must discuss with its 
employees, for political and religious employers, for higher education institutions engaged in 
regular coursework, and for casual conversations between employer and employees in the 
normal course of the employee’s duties.  Id. § 1(b), (f). 
 102. Id. § 1(5). 
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bargaining agreement.103  Moreover, employees who are disciplined 
for making a good-faith report about an unlawful workplace captive 
audience meeting are provided with a private whistle blower right of 
action under which they may be entitled to treble damages and 
attorney’s fees.104 
As of early June 2007, the bill has been approved by the Labor 
and Public Employees, Appropriations, and Judiciary Committees of 
the Connecticut General Assembly and is awaiting further legislative 
action.105  If it is enacted, it is scheduled to be effective on October 1, 
2007.106  Nevertheless, the Connecticut Officer of Legislative Research 
(OLR) has expressed concern that if legislation seeks to eliminate 
labor-oriented captive audience meetings, such legislation might be 
preempted by the NLRA.107  In this regard, the OLR concluded that, 
“it appears likely that, based on the history of the NLRA and court 
rulings, that the NLRA would preempt the bill’s provisions as they 
relate to labor organizing.”108 
Likely responding to these same preemption concerns, New 
Jersey enacted a modified Worker Freedom Act in 2006, the New 
Jersey Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act.109  This law 
does not seek to regulate captive audience meetings related to labor 
organizing as the Connecticut bill does.  Instead, the New Jersey 
legislation only makes it unlawful for any employer to force its 
employees to attend employer-sponsored meetings whose purpose is 
to discuss the employers’ opinions on religious and political matters.110  
 
 103. Id. § 1(e). 
 104. Id. § 1(d).  Such an action must be brought within ninety days of the unlawful meeting.  
Id. 
 105. See Connecticut General Assembly, H.B. No. 7326 Bill History, 
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/dtSearch_ 
lpa.html (last visited June 9, 2007) (must enter “bill status” and search for “7326”). 
 106. Connecticut Substitute House Bill No. 7326, § 1 (Jan. Session 2007), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2007/FC/2007HB-07326-R000540-FC.htm (Apr. 19, 2007). 
 107. OLR Research Report, Captive Audience Prohibitions and Federal Preemption, 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/ 
2006/rpt/2006-R-0204.htm (last visited May 15, 2007). 
 108. Id. 
 109. N.J.S.A. §§ 34:19-9-34:19-14. 
 110. Id. § 34:19-10 (“No employer or employer’s agent, representative or designee may, 
except as provided in section 3 of this act, require its employees to attend an employer-
sponsored meeting or participate in any communications with the employer or its agents or 
representatives, the purpose of which is to communicate the employer’s opinion about religious 
or political matters.”) (internal citation omitted).  The New Jersey legislature went out of its way 
to make clear that it was not seeking to regulate speech, but only conduct.  Under the law, 
employers can still converse with their employees in a voluntarily manner over such issues as 
long as the “employer notifies the employees that they may refuse to attend the meetings or 
accept the communications without penalty.” Id. § 34:19-10.  Similar exceptions discussed with 
regard to the Connecticut legislation also exist under the New Jersey law, see id. §§ 34:19-11(a), § 
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In the New Jersey bill, however, “political matters,” does not include 
meetings concerning the decision to join a labor organization.111 
The absence of labor organizations from the New Jersey law was 
not an oversight.  Indeed, before being enacted, the legislature 
amended the bill to remove the words “labor organization,” and a 
definition for that phrase, from the bill.112  As a result, employers may 
continue to hold mandatory captive audience meetings to express 
their anti-union views during unionization drives.113  And although it is 
still possible that the New Jersey law will be challenged on 
constitutional grounds as impermissibly interfering with employer 
speech,114 without the labor language it does not raise labor 
preemption issues. 
But what if Connecticut, Oregon, or another state passes a 
version of the Worker Freedom Act that does preclude employers 
from holding labor-oriented captive audience meetings?  The next 
section considers whether such legislation would be preempted by the 
NLRA under current labor preemption doctrine. 
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF FEDERAL LABOR PREEMPTION 
DOCTRINE 
When discussing current labor preemption doctrine in the United 
States, and the move to state-based legislative responses for what ills 
American labor relations law, one cannot avoid a sense of irony.115  
When Congress initially enacted the NLRA in 1935, state courts and 
legislatures were very pro-employer, and the labor movement sought 
 
34:19-11(b)(1)-(3), as well as similar remedial provisions for whistle blowers.  See id. §§ 34:19-12-
34:19-14. 
 111. See id. § 34:19-9. 
 112. See Worker Freedom from Employer Intimidation Act, As reported by the Senate 
Labor Committee on February 6, 2006, with amendments, 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/legis/2006c53.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007). 
 113. “Significantly, while the Act stems from the AFL-CIO’s model Freedom from 
Employer Intimidation Act, drafters of the New Jersey law eliminated the phrase ‘labor 
organizations’ from the Act’s definition of ‘political matters.’  Consequently, employers may 
continue to hold mandatory captive-audience speeches to communicate with employees their 
position on unions without running afoul of the Act. ” Worker Freedom from Employer 
Intimidation Act Goes Into Effect Immediately, JACKSON LEWIS LEGAL UPDATE, Aug. 16, 2006, 
http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/article.cfm?aid=979 (last visited May 15, 2007). 
 114. The question of whether the New Jersey law’s prohibitions on employer captive 
audience meetings for political and religious speech are constitutionally valid will be left for 
another day as it is beyond the present scope of this essay.  See supra note 8. 
 115. Gould, supra note 33, at 489 (“Ironically, the preemption doctrine was thought to 
implement the principles of the statute more effectively inasmuch as repressive state regimes 
were ousted from the jurisdiction over strikes, picketing and other forms of concerted activity.”). 
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broad protections from the new federal labor laws.116  At the time, 
federal labor law sought to proactively encourage unionization and 
collective bargaining between employers and their employees.117 
Starting with the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 
1947, however, the federal government’s orientations toward 
unionization became decidedly neutral, with the emphasis of the new 
amendment being on the employees’ ability to exercise free choice “in 
laboratory conditions”118 to decide whether they wished to be 
represented by a union.119  Even more recently, with the increased 
politicization of the National Labor Relations Board, especially by the 
second Bush administration,120 federal labor law has been interpreted 
to favor employers of many issues considered essential to organized 
labor.  The surprising upshot of all this labor history is that there has 
been an increasing push by the labor movement to decrease the scope 
of labor preemption to permit state legislation to provide union 
protections that federal labor law no longer does.121 
A. A Brief Primer on American Labor Preemption Law 
In its simplest form,122 labor preemption doctrine deals with the 
conflicts that inevitably arise between federal labor law and state laws 
and regulations.  Based on the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the 
U.S. Constitution,123 where federal and state labor laws collide, the 
state law in question must give way in favor of the federal scheme.  In 
 
 116. Gottesman, supra note 26, 378 n. 90 (“The [NLRA] was enacted out of dissatisfaction 
with state treatment of labor relations, and Section 7 stands as a declaration of ‘rights’ 
independently of the prohibitions on employer interference appearing in Section 8.”). 
 117. Estlund, supra note 10, at 1533. 
 118. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948) (“In election proceedings, it is the 
Board’s function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under 
conditions as nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees.”). 
 119. Estlund, supra note 10, at 1534 (“Taft-Hartley turned away from the forthright 
endorsement of collective bargaining and reframed the basic policy of the Act as favoring 
employee ‘free choice’ with respect to unionization and collective bargaining.”). 
 120. For the view that the second Bush Board is one of the most politicized in Board’s 
history, see Gould, supra note 33, at 470 (“The Bush II Board has pushed matters to one end of 
the continuum. The tilt on the seesaw has become the topsy-turvy process of an upside-down 
Ferris wheel.”). 
 121. Not everyone is in favor of depending on states more for labor law protection.  Id. at 
490 (“‘Red’ states like Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Alabama, and the like are 
forgotten in this equation. Thus, state legislation could repress workers under this 
antipreemption scheme and consequently, these ideas are misguided.”). 
 122. There is actually nothing “simple” about American labor law preemption.  See 
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 939 (13th ed. 2001) (“Federal-
state preemption issues are difficult to resolve in most substantive areas of the law, but they are 
particularly complicated in the area of labor-management relations.”). 
 123. U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”). 
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addition, the Commerce Clause124 has been interpreted to give 
Congress an almost limitless right to legislate in the labor relations 
area.125  Thus, Congress could have chosen to occupy the field of labor 
relations law exclusively, but it has never exercised its full powers in 
this regard, leaving the states free to pass many state and local laws 
and regulations that apply to the workplace.126  The difficult issue that 
remains, however, is:  What is the preemptive intent of the NLRA 
with regard to potentially inconsistent, parallel state labor laws?127  
The fact that the NLRA does not have an express preemption 
provision only serves to complicate the answer to this question.128 
To clarify where the preemption line may lie, it is helpful to 
understand that the Supreme Court has set forth two guiding 
principles or themes in its labor preemption decisions:  (1) the need to 
avoid conflicts in substantive rights; and (2) the need to protect the 
primary jurisdiction of the NLRB.129  With regard to guarding against 
conflict between state and federal labor law, state laws have been 
found preempted under at least four basic circumstances:  (1) where 
state laws restrict or potentially restricts the exercise of rights under 
Section 7 of the NLRA, (2) where state laws permit or potentially 
permit conduct that is restricted by the unfair labor practice 
provisions of Section 8, (3) where state laws provide a different 
remedial scheme than federal labor law, and (4) where state laws seek 
to regulate activity that Congress purposefully chose to leave 
unregulated. 
On the other hand, the complementary doctrine of primary 
jurisdiction brings to bear familiar administrative law concepts.  Most 
importantly, that Congress has created the NLRB to administer and 
implement the NLRB and has granted primary jurisdiction to the 
 
 124. Id. art. 1, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”). 
 125. Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Int’l Union Local 54, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984); 
N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Howell Chevrolet Co. v. 
N.L.R.B., 346 U.S. 482 (1953) (upholding application of NLRA to small local retailers of 
automobiles). 
 126. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955) (“By the Taft-Hartley Act, 
Congress did not exhaust the full sweep of legislative power over industrial relations given by the 
Commerce Clause.”). 
 127. When deciding issues of preemption, the purpose of Congress in enacting the NLRA is 
the “ultimate touchstone.”  Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978). 
 128. Even the Court has commented on the obtuseness of the statue: “[The NLRA] leaves 
much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.”  Garner v. 
Teamsters Local No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).  See also Gottesman, supra note 26, at 374 
(“The Court has found nothing on the face of the statute, nor in the legislative history, that 
reflects an express decision by Congress one way or the other respecting the survival of state 
laws.”). 
 129. COX ET AL., supra note 122, at 940. 
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NLRB, as the court of first resort, to adjudicate disputes that arise 
under the statute.130  This means that labor and management must first 
use the NLRB to resolve their labor relations disputes.  This primary 
reliance on the NLRB is, in turn, premised on the NLRB’s expertise 
and experience in resolving labor relations matters and on the 
importance of fashioning a coherent and uniform body of labor law by 
which parties can predicate their future conduct.131 
Based on these two guiding principles, the Supreme Court has 
developed three preemption doctrines:  (1) Section 301 preemption;132 
(2) Garmon preemption; and (3) Machinists preemption.  Section 301 
preemption concerns disputes arising under existing collective 
bargaining agreements so does not directly concern the argument 
being addressed in this essay, but the other two doctrines are 
potentially applicable. 
1. Garmon Preemption Analysis 
The Supreme Court held in San Diego Trades Council v. 
Garmon133 that the NLRA preempts state laws that Section 7 protects 
or arguably protects or that Section 8 prohibits or arguably 
prohibits.134  The use of the word “arguably” underscores the breadth 
of Garmon preemption.135  Nevertheless, Workplace Freedom Act 
legislation would not appear to be subject to Garmon preemption.  
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Jonathan D. Hacker, Note, Are Trojan Horse Union Organizers “Employees”?: A New 
Look at Deference to the NLRB’s Interpretation of NLRA Section 2(3), 93 MICH. L.REV. 772, 
776 (1995) (observing that courts have consistently recognized the Board’s experience and 
expertise with the complexities of industrial relations); Paula K. Knippa, Note, Primary 
Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Circumforaneous Litigant, 85 TEX. L.REV. 1289, 1315 (2007) (“The 
inconsistent holdings emanating out of both federal and state courts would destroy the 
uniformity of the regulatory scheme that Congress hoped to achieve through the administrative 
and adjudicatory clearinghouse of the [NLRB].”). 
 132. Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act permits parties to a labor dispute to enforce terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement in federal court.  29 U.S.C. § 185.  “Although section 301 
refers only to jurisdiction, it has been interpreted as authorizing federal courts to fashion a body 
of common law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.”  Antol v. Esposto, 100 
F.3d 1111 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 
(1957)). 
 133. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
 134. Id. at 245.  “Garmon preemption arises when there is an actual or potential conflict 
between state regulation and federal labor law due to state regulation of activity that is actually 
or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA.”  See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. 
Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1090 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 135. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 378 (“Garmon’s ‘arguably protected’ rule imposes greater 
restrictions on state courts with respect to labor disputes: so long as the assertion of NLRA 
protection is not frivolous, the state court is without authority to proceed, even though ultimately 
the NLRB might determine that the challenged conduct is not federally protected.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
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This is because the state law neither regulates employee activities that 
are actually or potentially protected under Section 7, nor does it 
permit employer activity that is actually or potentially prohibited 
under Section 8.  More specifically, Section 7 only provides rights to 
employees and says nothing about employer’s rights in the 
workplace.136  Section 7 is thus not even arguably implicated.137 
Similarly, there is nothing in Section 8 that arguably prohibits the 
states from outlawing captive audience speech on labor organizing.  
The unfair labor practices discussed therein only apply to employer or 
union interference, restraint of or coercion of employee’s Section 7 
rights.  Even if one were to accept the view of some courts that 
Section 8(c) protects “employer rights” under the First Amendment 
to express views on unionization in a non-coercive manner to its 
employees,138 it does not speak to whether employers may 
mandatorily require employees to attend meetings to hear those 
views.  Section 8(c) is just not applicable to the captive audience 
situation, since employers can still freely express their views to 
employees who chose to listen during workplace meetings without 
having to force their employees to be there.139  In short, workplace 
 
 136. Lechmere , Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 532 (1992) (“By its plain terms, . . . the 
NLRA confers rights only on employees.”) (emphasis in original); see also Gottesman, supra 
note 26, at 379 (“Section 7 protects only conduct of employees, not of employers. Indeed, the 
Act nowhere vests employers with protected rights; on its face, it forbids certain employer 
actions, but protects none.”).  But see infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 137. The en banc Ninth Circuit recently rejected the argument that “to say an activity is not 
punishable by the NLRA is to protect that activity.”  Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1091. 
 138. Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 100 (2d Cir. 2006) (“We 
therefore conclude that section 8(c) does protect employer speech in the unionization campaign 
context and can provide a basis for Garmon preemption.”); but see Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1091 
(“Notwithstanding the dissent’s mistaken insistence to the contrary, section 8(c) does not grant 
employers speech rights. Rather, it simply prohibits their noncoercive speech from being used as 
evidence of an unfair labor practice.”) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 
(1969)). 
 139. Indeed, because the employees are coerced into hearing the employer speech, one could 
even argue that the exceptions to Section 8(c) for “threats of reprisal or force” come into play 
and also make the provision inapplicable to the captive audience meeting context.  This appears 
to be the argument advanced by the Center for Policy Alternatives when it concludes: “The 
Worker Freedom Act addresses only the coercive expression of political and religious views, 
something that is entirely within states’ rights to legislate.”  See Center for Policy Alternatives, 
supra note 86; see also Story, supra note 42, at 405 (“[T]he NLRB and the courts overlook and/or 
permit many election statements and interventions by employers which are, in fact, coercive and 
which have a tendency, as a result, to chill the exercise of employee rights of self-organization.”).  
Story believes that captive audience speech is a paradigmatic example of such unrecognized 
coercive interventions. Id. at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of an employer’s legally-sanctioned right 
to hold such captive audience meetings, to prevent the union from holding them, to forbid the 
asking of questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees who ask ‘loaded questions’ is a 
manifestation of coercive power and domination.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Becker, 
supra note 42, at 559 (“Although the Board ratified captive audience speeches on account of the 
free speech proviso, such conduct involves an element of coercion easily distinguishable from 
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captive audience legislation is one of those “activities in labor 
relations [that] are neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA and 
are therefore not preempted under Garmon.”140 
2. Machinists Preemption Analysis 
With Garmon preemption not likely to be an obstacle, this 
analysis of the preemption of Worker Freedom Act legislation leads 
to another line of preemption cases under Machinists v. Wisconsin 
Employment Relations Commission.141  Machinists preemption does 
provide employers with protection from state law even though 
employers do not enjoy express rights under the NLRA.142  In 
Machinists, the Court held that the scheme of the NLRA implicitly 
left open the availability of economic force to the parties as a way to 
resolve labor stalemates.143  Because Congress meant to leave 
unregulated economic weapons not expressly protected by Section 7 
or prohibited by Section 8,144 state law is preempted when it interferes 
with lawful economic pressure applied by either party.  Indeed, where 
state laws have attempted to give additional economic power to one 
side or the other during the collective bargaining process, as some 
states have sought to do in the past, such laws have been found to be 
preempted under Machinists.145  In many respects, Machinists 
preemption has proven to be just as broad as Garmon preemption.146 
It is therefore more than just conceivable that the argument 
would be advanced that WFA legislation is preempted because an 
 
expression. The captive audience speech is diametrically opposed to the ‘free and open 
discussion’ the Board professes to promote.”). 
 140. Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1091. 
 141. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). 
 142. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 380 (“The Machinists doctrine depends upon a startling 
supposition for those familiar with the climate that spawned the Wagner Act: that Congress 
intended, in passing that Act, to ‘protect’ employers from state law disarmament.”). 
 143. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140; see also N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 495 
(1960) (“[T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is . . . part and parcel of 
the process of collective bargaining.”). 
 144. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 144. 
 145. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 618 (1986) 
(finding preempted city law that conditioned employer’s operations on the settlement of a labor 
dispute); Employers Ass’n v. United Steelworkers, 32 F.3d 1297, 1301 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding 
preempted under Machinists Minnesota law prohibiting permanent replacement of striking or 
locked out workers); Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 778 F. Supp. 95, 
98 (D. Mass. 1991) (finding preempted Boston ordinance banning permanent replacements that 
could pose threat to public safety). 
 146. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 381 (“The danger inherent in the Machinists doctrine is 
that it infers preemption based on rights that the Court discerns although they are nowhere 
expressed in the statute.”); Estlund, supra note 10, at 1576 (“Machinists preemption essentially 
transforms management’s economic power, and some of its rights under the state law of property 
and contract, into federal statutory rights.”). 
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employer has the right, consistent with the “free play of economic 
forces” under the NLRA,147 to hold workplace captive audience 
meetings during union organizational campaigns.  Opponents of the 
WFA would suggest that allowing such meetings is a well-established, 
lawful form of economic pressure that an employer may use to defeat 
a union’s campaign.148  Moreover, one might further argue that the 
Peerless Plywood rule, which disallows captive audience speeches by 
either side twenty-four hours before an election,149 indicates that the 
Board has chosen to regulate this area only to that extent and has 
decided purposefully not to regulate in this area any further.  State 
laws that would prohibit such labor-oriented captive audience 
meetings would therefore inappropriately place the state’s thumb on 
the union side of the scale and regulate an area of the law that the 
NLRA meant to keep unregulated.  As such, the argument continues, 
such state laws should be preempted under Machinists preemption.150 
There are, however, at least four potential counter-arguments, 
three of which lead to the conclusion that WFA legislation should not 
be found preempted under Machinists.  Under the first, less 
persuasive of these, at least one court has concluded that Machinists 
preemption doctrine has only been applied in the context of collective 
bargaining and not in the context of organizing.151  The argument is 
that the economic weaponry appropriate for the bargaining context is 
inapt for the election process where there is a lack of equality between 
unions and employers and not a true “marketplace of ideas.”152  
 
 147. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 (citing N.L.R.B. v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 
(1971)). 
 148. This exact argument was raised in the slightly different context of state financial 
accountability laws.  See Healthcare Ass’n of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Pataki, 471 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“The associations also raise an additional Machinists argument; they contend that the 
NLRA allows employers free speech as a ‘weapon’ to respond to union organizing campaigns 
and to deprive employers of this ‘weapon’ would alter the balance of power created by 
Congress.”).  Although not dispositive in this analysis, because different federal and state 
interests were at play, the Second Circuit in Pataki did not buy the employer’s argument.  Id. 
 149. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
 150. Professor Estlund appears to be of the view that, under current labor preemption law, 
this broad view of Machinists preemption would likely carry the day.  Estlund, supra note 10, at 
1579. 
 151. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (“Machinists doctrine is not likely to apply to organizing, a conclusion that the Chamber of 
Commerce conceded during oral argument when it acknowledged that interference with 
organizing is ‘typically’ analyzed under the Garmon doctrine.”); see also Estlund, supra note 10, 
at 1578 (arguing that the concept of free play of economic forces under Machinists is out of place 
in the unorganized workplace where there is not a fair contest or battle). 
 152. See Becker, supra note 42, at 497 (arguing that current conception of union elections 
“rests on a fiction of equality between unions and employers as candidates vying in the electoral 
arena.”); Story, supra note 42, at 388 (“[I]t becomes conceptually difficult to consider the 
workplace as ‘a marketplace.’ Instead, it is an all-but-monopolized private forum subject to 
strictly defined and limited incursions by nonowners, providing constitutionally-protected free 
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However, looking at the Machinist opinion itself, Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority, cites to an article by Archibald Cox for the 
proposition that Congress intended some conduct to remain 
unregulated and left to the free play of economic forces.153  In the cited 
article, Cox did not distinguish between collective bargaining and 
organizing, when he stated that, “Congress struck a balance of 
protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union 
organization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes that would be 
upset if a state could enforce statutes or rules of decisions resting 
upon its views concerning accommodation of the same interests.”154  
This conclusion is further bolstered by language in Metropolitan 
Edison Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts: “[Machinist cases] rely on the 
understanding that in providing in the NLRA a framework for self-
organization and collective bargaining, Congress determined both 
how much the conduct of unions and employers should be regulated, 
and how much it should be left unregulated.”155  It thus seems 
implausible, at least as a doctrinal matter, that Machinists was just a 
case that was supposed to apply in the collective bargaining context. 
Nevertheless, even if Machinists preemption were found to apply 
to the organizational context, there are at least three other persuasive 
arguments that help to explain why Machinists preemption would not 
preempt WFA legislation. First, responding to the argument that the 
Peerless Plywood rule lends support to the argument that the Board 
has already regulated captive audience meetings to the extent it 
thought necessary and purposely did not regulate any further, it is 
important to remember that, “Machinists applies solely to zones of 
activity left free from all regulation.”156  The extensive regulation of 
organizing activities by the NLRB through its General Shoe 
laboratory conditions doctrine157 demonstrates that “organizing-and 
employer speech in the context of organizing-is not such a zone.”158 
“‘A state law that both explicitly targets and directly regulates 
processes controlled by the NLRA’ might be preempted under 
 
speech to one side and not the other, and allowing speech to be delivered to an unwilling 
audience.”). 
 153. Machinists, 427 U.S. at 140 n.4. 
 154. Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L.REV. 1337, 1352 (1972). 
 155. 471 U.S. 724, 751 (1985) (emphasis added). 
 156. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Lockyer, 463 F.3d 1076, 1089 (9th Cir. 2006) (en 
banc) (emphasis in original) (citing Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of the Metro. Dist. v. 
Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993) (“Boston Harbor 
“)). 
 157. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 158. Lockyer, 463 F.3d at 1089 (emphasis in original) (citing Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 
545, 547-48 (1957); Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953)). 
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Garmon . . ., but is surely not preempted ‘under the Machinists 
doctrine.’”159 
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this 
form of preemption where the states “traditionally have had great 
latitude under their police powers to legislate as ‘to the protection of 
the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.’”160  In such 
circumstances, “[w]hen a state law establishes a minimal employment 
standard not inconsistent with the general legislative goals of the 
NLRA, it conflicts with none of the purposes of the Act.”161  Thus, 
mandated benefit laws, child labor laws, occupational safety and 
health laws, and minimum wage laws, have all survived NLRA 
preemption.162 
Similarly, states should be able to protect workers from being 
harassed and intimidated by employers at work through captive 
audience meetings as a minimal working condition.  Or put 
differently, states should be able to enact laws that prohibit employers 
from firing workers who refuse to attend captive audience meetings 
about the employer’s anti-union views.163  Such a state law would 
satisfy the conditions of such “minimum condition” laws by not 
“prevent[ing] the accomplishment of the purposes of the federal 
act.”164  Under such laws, employers would still able to communicate 
their views about unionization with their employees as Section 8(c) 
contemplates, but just not be able to force them to listen to such 
speeches at pains of losing their jobs.  Thus, there would be no general 
 
 159. Id. at 1089 n.11 (internal citations omitted). 
 160. Metropolitan Edison, 471 U.S. at 756 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 62 
(1873)). 
 161. Id. at 757; see also Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971) 
(“[The Court] cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any 
way the complex interrelationship between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much 
of this is left to the States.”).  The Court has used similar language in cases under the Railway 
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188: “We hold that the enactment by Congress of the Railway 
Labor Act was not a preemption of the field of regulating working conditions themselves and did 
not preclude the State . . . from making the order in question.”  Terminal Ass’n v. Trainmen, 318 
U.S. 1, 7 (1943). 
 162. Metropolitan Edison, 471 U.S. at 756. 
 163. Accord Gottesman, supra note 26, at 396 (“The states are free to forbid discharges for 
any number of reasons, such as refusal of sexual advances, whistle-blowing, refusing to violate 
the law, and filing workers’ compensation claims.”); see also Matthew W. Finkin, Bridging the 
“Representation Gap,” 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 411 (2001) (“The states are free to impose 
‘minimum terms of employment’ and extend these to unionized, as well as non-unionized, 
employees.”). 
 164. Metropolitan Edison, 471 U.S. at 756 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.20 
(1941); Electrical Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740, 749-751 
(1942); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. [497,] 504 [1978]). 
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legislative goal of the NLRA compromised by permitted WFA 
legislation to survive preemption.165 
Finally, not only should WFA legislation be able to survive 
Machinists preemption under a minimum conditions theory, but also 
based on the powers of the state to regulate property interests.  This 
exception to preemption law derives directly from the Court’s holding 
in Lechmere Inc. v. NLRB.166  More recently, the Court explained 
Lechmere and its holding on the relationship between federal labor 
law and state property regulation this way: 
Without addressing the merits of petitioner’s underlying claim, we 
note that petitioner appears to misconstrue Lechmere Inc. v. 
N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992).  The 
right of employers to exclude union organizers from their private 
property emanates from state common law, and while this right is 
not superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly 
protects it.  To the contrary, this Court consistently has maintained 
that the NLRA may entitle union employees to obtain access to an 
employer’s property under limited circumstances. See id., at 537, 
112 S.Ct., at 848; N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 
112, 76 S.Ct. 679, 684, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956).167 
Two important points can be derived from this passage:  (1) private 
property rights that emanate from state common law are not 
preempted by the NLRA; and (2) these same private property rights 
are also not protected by the NLRA.  The second point makes clear 
that Garmon preemption is not implicated in these property rights 
situations or, put differently, situations where employers seek to use 
their property as they wish.  But even more importantly, the first point 
makes clear that no form of labor preemption, Garmon or Machinists, 
comes into play when states decide to modify the common law of 
property through statute.168 
 
 165. See Finkin, supra note 163, at 411 (“[T]he states are free to reach those substantive 
aspects of the employment relationship that are not reached, or reached only partially by the 
NLRA.”).  There is a counter-argument that such a minimum-conditions law should be 
preempted because the Board has expressly concluded that employers are allowed to require 
employees to attend captive audience meetings. See Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 578 
(1948).  Nevertheless, captive audience meetings generally are neither arguably protected nor 
prohibited by the Act, as discussed above, and the NLRA’s policy of employee free choice runs 
counter to permitting employers to force employees to attend these meeting.  See Story, supra 
note 42, at 422 (“[T]he very exercise of an employer’s legally-sanctioned right to hold such 
captive audience meetings, to prevent the union from holding them, to forbid the asking of 
questions at such meetings, and to discharge employees who ask ‘loaded questions’ is a 
manifestation of coercive power and domination.”). 
 166. 502 U.S. 527 (1992). 
 167. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 168. Accord Waremart Foods, 337 N.L.R.B. 389 (2001) (“The Respondent asserts that the 
ability to exclude non-union representatives from its property is the kind of economic weapon 
that Congress intended to be available to employers and thus is not subject to regulation by the 
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The Court applied this very same principle to the advantage of 
employers in Lechmere where it found that non-employee union 
organizers generally had no right to access employer property to 
solicit for union membership.169  The right to exclude these organizers 
did not derive from federal labor law, but rather the property rights of 
the employers.170  And just as a state may permit employers to exclude 
non-employee organizers as part of the employer’s property rights, 
just as surely states can seek to limit those same property rights and 
refuse to allow employers to harass or intimidate their employees 
during mandatory meetings discussing the employer’s anti-union 
views.171  It is just a matter of states, by statutes, modifying the bundle 
of property rights that employers enjoy under state law.172  Lechmere 
and its progeny stand for nothing less than the proposition that the 
NLRA does not supersede the ability of states to regulate common 
law rights of property and therefore WFA legislation is within the 
state’s power to undertake if they choose to do so.173 
In short, both the minimum conditions and property rights 
exceptions to Machinist preemption would seem to permit state 
enactments of WFA legislation to avoid NLRA preemption. 
 
States. Accordingly, the Respondent contends that the State’s attempt to deprive it of that right 
is preempted under Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, 427 U.S. 132 
(1976). We reject that contention.”), vacated on other grounds, 354 F.3d 870 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 169. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 537. 
 170. See Glendale Assocs., Ltd. v. N.L.R.B., 347 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]his 
Court, along with other Circuits and the Board, have found Lechmere to be inapplicable to cases 
where an employer excluded nonemployee union representatives in the absence of a state 
property right to do so.”); see also id. at 1152 (“An employer’s state property right controls 
where an employer may ban nonemployee union representatives because ‘state property law is 
what creates the interest entitling employers to exclude organizers in the first instance. Where 
state law does not create such an interest, access may not be restricted consistent with Section 
8(a)(1) [of the NLRA].”) (citing N.L.R.B. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 171. See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring) (“Appellants’ claim in this case amounts to no less than a suggestion that the 
common law of trespass is not subject to revision by the State, notwithstanding the California 
Supreme Court’s finding that state-created rights of expressive activity would be severely 
hindered if shopping centers were closed to expressive activities by members of the public. If 
accepted, that claim would represent a return to the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 25 
S.Ct. 539, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905), when common-law rights were also found immune from revision 
by State or Federal Government.”). 
 172. See Gottesman, supra note 26, at 412 (“While there is a zone of federal prohibition, 
there is no zone of federal protection of an employer’s right to exclude. If states wish to go 
further in restricting the employer’s property rights, no federal interest is implicated.”). 
 173. For a thoughtful argument that unions’ rights of access to employer property should not 
even depend on state property law, but on whether exclusion chills employees’ Section 7 rights, 
see Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Taking State Property Rights Out of Federal Labor Law, 47 B.C. L.REV. 
891, 892-93 (2006) (“[T]he Board no longer would consider state property rights. Instead, it 
would presume that an employer’s peaceful request to stop organizing activity on what appears 
to be its property is lawful, and presume that any action going beyond such a request violates the 
NLRA.”). 
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IV. RECONCEPTUALIZING AMERICAN LABOR PREEMPTION LAW 
FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM 
Although this essay argues that under current labor preemption 
doctrine, Worker Freedom Act legislation should survive labor law 
preemption, the answer is not nearly as clear cut as it should be.  And 
in an environment where there exist an increasing number of judges 
with pro-employer, conservative judicial philosophies,174 it would not 
be far-fetched to predict that a number of courts would still apply 
these same labor preemption principles under the Machinists line of 
cases to strike down WFA legislation.  Indeed, this outcome may be 
more likely based solely on this generation of federal court judges’ 
lack of familiarity with labor law cases because of their relative rarity 
in the federal courts these days.175 
In any event, to protect employees from the evils of workplace 
captive audience meetings, this section seeks to provide a more sound 
doctrinal basis for finding WFA legislation not preempted by federal 
labor law.  In making this argument, this essay relies heavily on the 
persuasive analysis put forth by Professor Michael Gottesman in his 
piece concerning how labor preemption doctrine should be re-
interpreted consistent with the purposes of federal labor law and 
principles of federalism. 
In the article, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws 
Facilitating Unionization,176 Gottesman argues that the current 
approach to labor law preemption under Garmon and Machinist 
preemption is overbroad.177  Instead, he points to a significant 
distinction, overlooked by courts, between different types of labor-
oriented conduct that states seek to regulate.  Specifically, some 
conduct, like picketing, lies on a protected-prohibited continuum that 
Congress has chosen to regulate in its entirety.178  “[C]onduct on a 
continuum is conduct that the NLRA protects up to a point and 
 
 174. James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni & Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward 
Labor Unions? Applying the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1675, 1715-19 (1999) (correlating union support in labor cases with a judges being appointed 
by a Democratic president); Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact: The 
Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
247, 265 (2005) (“Due to the conservative appellate appointments by President George W. Bush, 
the federal judiciary is presumably more conservative today than in 2000.”). 
 175. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of “Hiding the Ball”: NLRB Policymaking and 
the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U. L. REV. 387, 426- 27 (1995). 
 176. Gottesman, supra note 26. 
 177. Id. at 355 (“My thesis is that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA) does not wholly preempt the states’ ability to adopt laws facilitating 
unionization and enhancing employee leverage in collective bargaining with employers.”). 
 178. Id. at 357. 
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prohibits beyond that point.”179  Either picketing is protected as 
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection under Section 7 
(because it enhances bargaining power) or it is prohibited conduct 
under Section 8 (like secondary picketing180  because of its impact on 
the business of neutral employers).181  But all in all, Congress has 
chosen to completely occupy the field of employee picketing rights 
under federal labor law and it is for the NLRB, not the states, to 
decide where the line exists on this picketing continuum between 
protected and prohibited conduct.182  It is important that the NLRB 
make this determination between protected and prohibited picketing 
in a consistent, uniform matter so future exercise of these rights will 
not be chilled.183  So with picketing, the broad Garmon preemption 
doctrine, which seeks to avoid substantive conflicts in situations where 
conduct is even arguably protected or prohibited, makes much more 
sense. 
On the other hand, there is conduct, like a union seeking an equal 
opportunity to address employees on employer property that does not 
lay on a continuum that Congress has chosen to regulate completely.184  
“Conduct not on a continuum is prohibited in some of its 
manifestations, but federal law does not protect it otherwise.”185 In 
these situations, Gottesman argues that states should be free to 
regulate beyond the point that the federal labor law, and 
corresponding federal interest, no longer come into play.186  In this 
vein, he states that, “[i]n choosing a standard, states may consciously 
attempt to affect the relative interests of employers, unions and 
employees regarding unionization and collective bargaining.”187 
 
 179. Id. at 395. 
 180. Section 8(b)(4) prevents most forms of secondary picketing by unions because it causes 
neutral employers to become embroiled in labor disputes not of their own making.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4); Estlund, supra note 10, at 1607 (“[T]he [NLRA]’s ban on secondary boycotts 
constrains the means by which unions can put pressure on legally ‘neutral’ employers . . . . “); 
Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder 
Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L.REV. 1018, 1032 (1998) (“[T]he secondary boycott 
provisions try to prevent unions from dragging neutral employers into the fray.”). 
 181. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 357. 
 182. Id. (“Congress had created an expert agency, the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), to identify the fine line that distinguishes protected from prohibited conduct. To allow 
state regulation would create an intolerable risk to federal interests; state courts might err in 
locating the line and award damages for conduct the N.L.R.B. would deem protected by the 
NLRA.”). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. at 358. 
 185. Id. at 395. 
 186. Id. at 359. 
 187. Id. at 360. 
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For instance, Congress and the courts have interpreted the 
NLRA to permit union access to employer property to address 
employees during organizational campaigns only when the union is 
completely unable to communicate with employees through other 
alternative means or where the employer discriminatorily restricts 
access to property.188  Beyond this extremely limited right to access 
employer property, federal labor law is silent on the ability of the 
employer to exclude union organizers from their property.189  And 
indeed, Lechmere, decided after the Gottesman article, stands for the 
proposition that an employer’s property interest almost always 
outweighs the competing derivative rights of non-employee, union 
organizers under Section 7 of the NLRA.190  But it does not stand to 
reason, therefore, that the NLRA somehow “confer[s] upon 
employers a right they had not theretofore possessed:  to be free of 
state dedication of private property for union organizing wherever 
federal law did not create a right of union access.”191 
Nor should the continuing validity of the Machinists preemption 
doctrine impact this modified labor preemption doctrine.  As 
Gottesman argues, it is unlikely that, “Congress provided access only 
in exceptional circumstances because it thought that unions and 
employees ought not to communicate too freely or that employers 
should be protected against any broader intrusion on their 
premises.”192  It is much more likely that “Congress provided limited 
access merely because it did not think the federal interest in union-
employee communication warranted any greater intrusion on the 
state’s sovereign prerogative to define property interests.”193  In other 
words, because limited access rights to union organizers show respect 
for state regulation over property interests, states should be able to 
adjust those property interests as they see fit without running afoul of 
NLRA preemption. 
Indeed, this conclusion is consistent with what the Supreme 
Court later stated in Thunder Basin Coal Co.:  “The right of 
 
 188. Lechmere Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 502 U.S. 527, 538 (1992); N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox 
Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).  As discussed in Part I, this is an extremely narrow exception that 
is limited to such situations as lumber camps and remote resorts.  See supra notes 66, 72 and 
accompanying text. 
 189. Another way of viewing this Congressional silence on the issue is that the federal 
interest to insure union access to employer property to foster organizational rights does not 
extend to those situations where unions have other viable means for contacting employees it 
seeks to organize.  Gottesman, supra note 26, at 358. 
 190. Lechmere, 502 U.S. at 533. 
 191. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 358. 
 192. Id. at 416-17 
 193. Id. at 417. 
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employers to exclude union organizers from their private property 
emanates from state common law, and while this right is not 
superseded by the NLRA, nothing in the NLRA expressly protects 
it.”194  Unlike the picketing example, there is no other side of the 
continuum where access to employer property is prohibited under 
Section 8.  This is simply not an area where Congress chose to 
completely preempt the field and the NLRA “did not otherwise 
intend to disturb the states’ existing authority to define property 
interests.”195 
Similarly, workplace captive audience speech is also conduct of 
the non-continuum variety that states should be free to regulate as 
property interests beyond a certain point without fear of Garmon or 
Machinists preemption.  Indeed, state regulation in the workplace 
captive audience meeting context could actually occur in one of two 
ways.  First, state laws could require that unions be given equal access 
to employer property for pro-union captive audience speeches when 
employers give their own captive audience speeches.  Like Lechmere 
and Babcock, NuTone & Avondale stands for the proposition that 
unions do not have the right to address employees on employer 
property unless it is shown that the union has completely no other 
alternative way to communicate with prospective union members.196  
Beyond that point, however, state property law takes over and 
generally permits employers to exclude unions from holding captive 
audience meetings.  But again, the point is that unions are excluded as 
a matter of state property law, not federal labor law.  Nothing in the 
NLRA protects employers in their ability to exclude the union from 
the workplace.197  Consequently, a state law modifying property rights 
should not be preempted by the NLRA.198 
The Worker Freedom Act legislation that out-and-out prohibits 
employer captive audience speech on labor-oriented topics would be 
just another way for states to modify existing property interests in a 
 
 194. Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 217 n.21 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 195. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 358.  Gottesman aptly observes in this regard: “In [these 
non-continuum cases], the federal interest is in protecting employees’ rights of self-organization: 
there is no countervailing federal right for employers. Any such employer rights are derived 
from state law, and the choice whether to constrict them thus should lie with the states.”  Id. at 
411. 
 196. N.L.R.B. v. Steelworkers (NuTone & Avondale), 357 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1958). 
 197. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 417 (“Congress did not confer upon employers a federal 
right to fence out organizers.”). 
 198. One Ninth Circuit case has actually cited Professor Gottesman’s article and upheld a 
state law permitting additional property rights for unions.  See N.L.R.B. v. Calkins, 187 F.3d 
1080, 1095 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding California law permitting labor picketing on private property 
not preempted by the NLRA). 
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way that facilitates unionization.  In this context, Section 8(c) requires 
the minimum condition of allowing employers to share their views on 
unionization with their employees.  To the extent that a state were to 
pass a law somehow interfering with all non-coercive speech to 
employees prior to twenty-four hours before a union election, that law 
would be rightly preempted under Garmon preemption as something 
that would be prohibited under Section 8.  On the other hand, if the 
free speech rights of the employer are secured, and the only thing at 
issue is whether employers can force their employees to hear their 
views on unionization during work, a part of the continuum has been 
reached where federal labor law is silent and there is no longer any 
federal interests implicated.  Rather, the realm of state property law 
has been reached, and consistent with notions of federalism,199 states 
should given free reign to modify the bundle of property rights that 
employers currently hold and prohibit captive audience meetings 
during union organization campaigns. 
Now, this way of seeing labor preemption is no doubt a double-
edged sword for those who favor increased unionization in this 
country.  Just as more progressive states may choose to modify 
property rights to permit unions equal access to property and to 
prohibit labor-oriented captive audience speech, other states could 
manipulate state law to favor employer interests.200  Although state 
legislators have the ability to be creative in this manner, it is hard to 
imagine how the background norms animating state property, or 
contract law for that matter, could be made much more employer-
friendly than they already are.201  Employees in the United States exist 
in a world where employers have nearly absolute property rights to 
exclude unions and others from their workplaces and the 
employment-at-will doctrine gives employers maximum flexibility 
when it comes to hiring and terminating their employees.202  In short, 
the benefits of permitting states to legislate in a way that favors the 
ability of unions to organize seems to greatly outweigh any 
 
 199. Gottesman, supra note 26, at 361 (“[T]he Warren Court’s pro-preemption preference is 
inconsistent with constitutional federalism and separation-of-power norms.”). 
 200. Gould, supra note 33, at 490 (““Red” states like Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Alabama, and the like are forgotten in this equation. Thus, state legislation could 
repress workers under this antipreemption scheme and consequently, these ideas are 
misguided.”). 
 201. Accord Estlund, supra note 10, at 1574 (“Employers have the property that is . . . 
protected, while organized labor traditionally relies on the power of numbers and of more or less 
disruptive concerted activities such as picketing.”). 
 202. Id. at 1596 (“[Employers] own the workplace, and they effectively own the employees’ 
jobs under the prevailing American presumption of employment at will.”). 
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disadvantage that might come if legislatures seek to pass employer-
friendly laws under the same preemption theory advanced above.203 
And besides, there’s really nothing to lose given the current state 
of American labor law, is there?204 
CONCLUSION 
Workplace captive audience meetings remain one of the most 
effective, and inequitable, tools that employers in the United States 
use during union organizational campaigns.  Rather than there being 
any let up in the use of these meetings, employers are taking 
advantage of the unregulated nature of their workplaces to 
increasingly also subject their employees to their views on political 
and religious matters. 
Commendably, and because there exists a federal void in this 
area of workplace law, states have taken the legislative initiative to 
ban such workplace captive audience meetings.  Although this 
Workplace Freedom Act legislation has not passed any state 
legislature in its unmodified form as of the writing of this essay, recent 
successes in the legislative process suggest that there is reason to 
believe that such laws will soon be enacted. 
With regard to labor-oriented captive audience meetings, this 
essay takes the view that WFA legislation should not be preempted by 
the NLRA under current labor preemption doctrine.  Rather, states 
should remain free to regulate the minimum conditions of 
employment and the property rights of employers without running 
afoul of federal labor relations law. 
Nevertheless, there is always the possibility that WFA legislation 
could be found preempted under a too-generous interpretation of 
Machinists preemption.  Consequently, this essay renews the call for 
the adoption of a modified labor preemption doctrine in the United 
 
 203. Accord id. at 1577 (“A narrower preemption doctrine would thus predictably afford 
more room for the regulation of employer conduct than for the regulation of employee and 
union conduct.”); Richard B. Freeman, Will Labor Fare Better Under State Labor Relations 
Law?, 58 LAB. & EMP. REL. ASS’N SERIES 125 (2006), available at 
http://www.press.uillinois.edu/journals/irra/proceedings2006/freeman.html (last visited June 8, 
2007) (“Labor would fare better if the United States reduced federal preemption of private 
sector labor relations law and devolved the legal regulation and enforcement of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining to the states.”). 
 204. Freeman, supra note 203 (“While there are no guarantees, turning the law regulating 
private sector labor relations and/or its enforcement over to the states cannot be much worse 
than the U.S. labor law is now. Washington has failed. Why not see if Sacramento and Bismarck, 
Albany and Oklahoma City, Des Moines and Detroit, Salt Lake City and Madison can do 
better?”). 
SECUNDAARTICLE29-2.DOC 1/24/2008  2:00:03 PM 
246 COMP. LABOR LAW & POL’Y JOURNAL [Vol. 29:209 
States by the U.S. Supreme Court.205  Under this conception, 
championed first by Professor Gottesman, states would be free in non-
continuum instances to pass state legislation that increases the chances 
for workers to form unions. 
The Court is best able to undertake this needed modification 
because, in the absence of an express preemption provision in the 
NLRA, the Court has been the driving force in promulgating current 
labor preemption doctrine.  And just as the Court was free to fashion 
the current doctrine, it should be equally free to reformulate labor 
preemption law to be more consistent with the purposes of NLRA 
and with the principles of federalism. 
 
 
 205. Given the political impasse that has stymied labor law reform for the last fifty years, this 
essay takes the view that it is unrealistic to expect Congress to change preemption law through a 
federal amendment to the NLRA any time soon. 
